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ANALYSIS
PROVISIONAL SUPERVISION AND WORKERS' WAGES:
AN ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL
Philip Smart* and Charles D. Booth**
In May 2001, the Companies (Corporate Rescue) Bill was gazetted. The Bill makes
provision for a statutory corporate rescue mechanism, to be known as provisional
supervision. The most controversial aspect of the Bill is the treatment of workers'
wages. The Bill essentially requires that before a company may even enter into
provisional supervision, it must have paid off in full all debts (and other entitlements)
owing to its workers. The Bill does not, however, explain how a financially distressed
company is supposed to find the cash to meet the statutory requirement. This
requirement may also be criticised because it is at odds with the treatment of workers'
wages in other insolven t procedures, thus leading to unfairness. This article proposes
an alternative approach, one which, it is suggested, is in the interests of both financially
troubled companies and their workers.
Introduction
Even before the onset of the Asian financial crisis in mid-1997, it had
long been recognised that a statutory corporate rescue mechanism was
needed in Hong Kong.' Hence, the legislative implementation of the ini-
tiatives suggested by the Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong (the
LRC) in October 1996 in its Report on Corporate Rescue and Insolvent
Trading2 has been eagerly awaited by insolvency practitioners and others
in the territory. In January 2000, the Companies (Amendment) Bill 2000
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For background to the topic of corporate rescue in Hong Kong, see The Law Reform Commission of
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(Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1995) and Charles D. Booth, "Hong Kong Insolvency Law Reform:
Preparingfor the Millenium" TR[2001] ]BL 126.
2 The Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong, Report on Corporate Rescue and Insolvent Trading (Hong
Kong Reform: Preparing for the Next Millenium: Government Printer, 1996) available at http://
www.into.gov.hk/hkreforin/reports/index.htm.
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(the 2000 Bill)' was gazetted and full details of the proposed provisional
supervision regime became available.
Although there were many interesting (and some controversial)' aspects
in the provisional supervision regime as put forward in the 2000 Bill, broader
public debate concentrated almost exclusively on the treatment of workers'
wages and other entitlements.' That is because the 2000 Bill adopted what,
as far as these commentators are aware, was a unique position on the issue of
workers' wages, it being proposed that, before a company could even go into
provisional supervision, it must either have:
1 actually paid off all sums owing (pursuant to the Employment Ordi-
nance) to its employees and former employees; or
2 established a trust account at a bank containing sufficient funds to ex-
tinguish all such debts.'
The major difficulty with requiring an already financially distressed company
to settle all such debts before it might seek refuge in provisional supervision is,
of course, that the company may very well lack the necessary cash to make such
payments. The late Joseph Heller' might have found the situation familiar. It is
no exaggeration to state that sections of the insolvency practitioner commu-
nity in Hong Kong regarded the 2000 Bill as "fatally flawed"' in this respect.
Although the proposed provisional supervision regime was dropped from
the legislative agenda in June 2000, it has recently re-appeared as the Com-
panies (Corporate Rescue) Bill 2001 (the Corporate Rescue Bill)9 and, as
The Companies (Amendment) Bill 2000 was gazetted on 7 Jan 2000. See Hong Kong Government
Gazette, Legal Supplement No 3, C5. The 2000 Bill and other relevant materials are available on the
Legislative Council's Website, at http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr99-00/english/bc/bcO6/general/ebcO6.htm.
The 2000 Bill would have added some 33 sections, the proposed ss 168U to 168ZZA, to the Compa-
nies Ordinance (Cap 32). For details of the current legislative proposals, gazetted in May 2001, see n
9 below.
4 See, generally, P. St. J. Smart and Charles D. Booth, "Reforming Corporate Rescue Procedures in
Hong Kong" [20011 Corporate Finance & Insolvency Law Review (forthcoming). For further details on
the proposed provisional supervision regime, see http://www.insolvency.com.hk/
new%20provisional-supervision.htm.
5 See, for example, Enoch Yiu, "New law protects laid off workers", South China Morning Post (Business
News), 4 June 1999, p 2; Enoch Yiu, "Warning note sounded on corporate rescue plan", South China
Morning Post (Business News), 5 June 1999, p 3; and Jan Blaauw, "HK firms need more protection",
South China Morning Post (Markets), 29 May 2000, p 12. Note also Joe Bannister, "UK and Hong
Kong Propose New Rules for Company Rescues" IFL Rev 51, 54 (June 2000) and Jane Moir,
" 'Unworkable' rescue bill bounces back into LegCo", South China Morning Post (Business News),
6 Feb 2001, p 1.
6 See proposed s 168ZA(c)(iv); essentially the same requirements are now to be found in para 3(d) of
the Second Schedule to the Companies (Corporate Rescue) Bill 2001, n 9 below.
Author of the celebrated novel, Catch-22 (1961).
See http://www.insolvency.com.hk/new%20provisional-supervision.htm for criticism and comments
by Simon Powell and Stephen Briscoe, two well-known insolvency practitioners.
9 The Companies (Corporate Rescue) Bill 2001 was gazetted on 18 May 2001. See Hong Kong Gov-
ernment Gazette, Legal Supplement No 3, C615. The Corporate Rescue Bill will also introduce
provisions on insolvent trading into the law of Hong Kong, see para 8 of the Eighth Schedule.
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expected,'o the position in relation to workers' wages has not been funda-
mentally altered." The purpose of this article, after briefly analysing the defects
of the treatment of workers' wages under what is now the Corporate Rescue
Bill, is to put forward an alternative proposal.
Workers' Wages and Corporate Insolvency
Where a company is insolvent and a winding up petition has been presented,
employees who have not received their wages (and other entitlements) can
apply to the Protection of Wages on Insolvency Fund (the PWIF) for ex gratia
payments up to specified amounts." The LRC's Report on Corporate Rescue
and Insolvent Trading proposed that, ideally, the Protection of Wages on
Insolvency Ordinance should be amended so that the onset of provisional
supervision should trigger the operation of the PWIF.' (It may be noted that,
in the United Kingdom, employees may claim their entitlements from the
equivalent statutory fund whether their employer has gone into liquidation
or has become subject to a statutory rescue procedure.)" However, concerns
were expressed in Hong Kong that, if the LRC's recommendation were to be
adopted, unscrupulous employers might lay off their employees - without
10 See Jane Moir," 'Unworkable' rescue bill bounces back into LegCo" (n 5 above). On 5 Feb 2001, the
Financial Services Bureau submitted a paper (CB(1) 522/00-01(03)) to the Financial Affairs Panel
of the Legislative Council dealing with this topic; para 2 states: "We propose to maintain the original
proposal of requiring a company to settle all outstanding arrears that it owed to its employees before
starting a statutory corporate rescue operation as set out in the Companies (Amendment) Bill 2000."
The paper is available at http://Iegco.gov.hk/yrOO-0l/english/panels/fa/papers/fac.htm .
" See para 3(d) of the Second Schedule to the Corporate Rescue Bill, set out below.
12 Protection of Wages on Insolvency Ordinance (Cap 380), s 16(l)(b). Although s 16(l)(b) specifi-
cally refers to the presentation of a winding-up petition, rather than the making of a winding-up
order, the practice of the Protection of Wages on Insolvency Fund Board appears to be not to exercise
its discretion to make ex gratia payments where the company is not in fact going to be wound up. A
number of cases have arisen recently in Hong Kong where a petition has been presented, but the
company has obtained a stay of proceedings whilst negotiating with creditors in order to enter into a
scheme of arrangement. In such circumstances, the Board has refused to make ex gratia payments on
the basis that it is not a "corporate bailout" fund. See Antoine So, "Sacked workers denied fund aid",
South China Morning Post, 4 Jan 2000, p 4; Jane Moir "UDL rescue scheme gets go-ahead", South
China Morning Post (Business News), 19 Apr 2000, p 4; and Re UDL Holdings Ltd (No 3) [2000] 3
HKC 405, appeal dismissed [2001] 1 HKLRD 156. In Re BG Lighting Co Ltd, CWU 3 of 2000, 22 May
2000 (unrep., Court of First Instance), Le Pichon J observed:
"I would respectfully suggest that the correctness of the 'policy' of refusing to make ex gratia pay-
ments to former employees in the absence of a winding-up order needs to be revisited. The Board's
discretion is triggered, not by a winding-up order but by the presentation of a winding-up peti-
tion: see s 16(1)(b) of the Protection of Wages on Insolvency Ordinance. To refuse to exercise the
discretion without a winding-up order appears to be not only improper but also contrary to legis-
lative intent. The Board should take note that its 'policy' has far-reaching ramifications: it may
not ultimately be in the interest of the ex-employee creditors and in the longer term may prove to
be damaging to the public interest and the prosperity of Hong Kong."
13 See n 2 above.
14 Ibid., para 5.42.
15 See the Employment Rights Act 1996, s 184.
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paying them their entitlements - and then put the company into provisional
supervision; thereby, so it was argued, passing the burden of unpaid wages,
severance and other payments onto the PWIF.16 It is also significant that in
the financial year 1997-98, during which the impact of the Asian financial
crisis began to be felt in Hong Kong, the PWIF recorded its first ever deficit
(some HK$25 million), as the number of claims by employees increased by
more than 60 per cent over the previous year.17 The Government's initial
estimate (given in the Legislative Council on 3 February 1999) was that there
would be deficits of HK$160 million in 1998-99, of HK$114 million in 1999-
2000 and of HK$108 million in 2000-01.18 (In fact, the Annual Report of
the Protection of Wages on Insolvency Fund Board 1998-99 reveals that the
deficit for 1998-99 was higher, some HK$185.3 million.)19 It was even sug-
gested that the solvency of the PWIF might be threatened if a significant
number of provisional supervisions were to be commenced after the enact-
ment of the new procedures." A consultation exercise" was conducted by
the Financial Services Bureau in 1999, as a result of which the relevant pro-
vision in the 2000 Bill was drafted so that the appointment of a provisional
supervisor could not come into effect until the appointor had filed an affida-
vit stating that the company:22
"(A) has a trust account:
(i) with an authorised institution within the meaning of the Bank-
ing Ordinance (Cap 155);
(ii) the exclusive purpose of which is to provide money to pay all
debts and liabilities owing, by virtue of the Employment Ordi-
nance (Cap 57), by the company to its employees and former
employees before the relevant date; and
(iii) containing sufficient money to pay all those debts and liabili-
ties; or
(B) has paid all debts and liabilities, or has no debts and liabilities, ow-
ing, by virtue of the Employment Ordinance (Cap 57), to its employees
and former employees before the relevant date."
16 Stewart Oldfield, "Supervision plan stirs collapse fear", South China Morning Post (Business News),
29 Dec 1998, p 1. See also Karen Cooper, "Authorities fear exploitation of workers aid fund", South
China Morning Post (Business News), 22 Dec 1998, p 3.
17 Annual Report of the Protection of Wages on Insolvency Fund Board 1997-98, p 5 .
18 Hong Kong Hansard, 3 Feb 1999 (Secretary for Education and Manpower, in response to a question
from Mr Eric Li) (see http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr98-99/english/counmtg/hansard/990203fe.htm).
19 Annual Report of the Protection of Wages on Insolvency Fund Board 1998-99, p 4.
20 These commentators would suggest, however, that the financial impact of extending the PWIF to
provisional supervision would be relatively minor, see text accompanying nn 35-38 below.
21 Consultation Paper on Corporate Rescue and the Protection of Wages on Insolvency Fund (Treatment of
Employees in "Provisional Supervision"), Feb 1999, available at the Financial Services Bureau's Website,
at http://www.info.gov.hk/fsb/consult/index.htm.
22 Proposed s 168ZA(c)(iv); see new Corporate Rescue Bill, Second Schedule, para 3(d), set out below.
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The Corporate Rescue Bill has adopted a like approach (although it in fact
increases the sums in respect of which a company is required to make provi-
sion before going into provisional supervision).23 The Corporate Rescue Bill
requires that before a provisional supervisor can be appointed, the appoin-
tor24 must have filed an affidavit 25 stating that the company:26
"(i) has a trust account:
(A) with an authorised institution within the meaning of the Bank-
ing Ordinance (Cap 155);
(B) the exclusive purpose of which is to provide money to pay all
debts and liabilities owing, by virtue of the Employment Ordi-
nance (Cap 57), by the company to its former employees before
the relevant date (including those employees whose contracts of
employment will be terminated on or after the relevant date) and
to pay all wages owing by virtue of that Ordinance to its existing
employees up to the relevant date; and
(C) containing sufficient money to pay all those debts and liabilities;
or
(ii) has paid all debts and liabilities, or has no debts and liabilities, owing,
by virtue of the Employment Ordinance (Cap 57), to its former em-
ployees before the relevant date (including those employees whose
contracts of employment will be terminated on or after the relevant
date) and owes no wages by virtue of that Ordinance to its existing
employees up to the relevant date."
Criticism of the Treatment of Workers' Wages Under the Corporate
Rescue Bill
As has been noted above, the major difficulty flowing from the treatment of
outstanding workers' wages under the proposed legislation is that a company
that is contemplating going into provisional supervision - and therefore likely
to be in serious financial difficulty - is required to find enough money to pay
off all liabilities to its employees and former employees or to fund the rel-
evant trust account for such purpose. Clearly, this requirement might, in certain
23 This is because para 3(d), see text accompanying n 26 below, gives an extended definition to "former
employees", so as to include employees who, although not laid off as of the relevant date, will be laid
off subsequently. This presumably covers employees who the directors know will later be laid off
under the provisional supervision.
24 The appointment of the provisional supervisor will normally be a matter for the board. See Corporate
Rescue Bill, s 6.
2 See Corporate Rescue Bill, s 8 for details.
26 Corporate Rescue Bill, Second Schedule, para 3(d).
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instances, actually prevent a company from going into provision supervision;
thereby precipitating the winding up of the company. But this is only one of
several problems with the legislation."
Firstly, where a company does not have the cash to pay off its liabilities to
its employees in full, it might seek funding from a bank; but it is likely that a
bank would be unwilling to lend such sums to any company desirous of going
into provisional supervision, as the bank would know that the money would
go straight to the employees and would not directly assist in re-financing the
company. Second, there is the (highly undesirable) likelihood that a com-
pany contemplating provisional supervision might stop making any effort to
pay its trade creditors and hoard as much cash as possible in order to accumu-
late a sufficient lump sum to pay off its workers. To this extent it might even
be said that the legislation encourages a company deliberately to create what,
in other circumstances, might be condemned as a preference." (Although it
would appear that, were the company subsequently to go into liquidation, the
liquidator could not recover the moneys paid to the employees as preferences,
since the motive of the directors29 would not have been to improve the posi-
tion of the employees, but to enable the company to meet the statutory
requirements to enter into provisional supervision.) Third, the legislation
leads to inconsistency: for where an insolvent company is wound up, the work-
ers can only look to the PWIF for payment up to specified maximum amounts;
but if that very same company were to go into provisional supervision, the
Corporate Rescue Bill would require "all debts and liabilities" arising by vir-
tue30 of the Employment Ordinance (without any ceiling or cap, as there is
under the PWIF scheme) owed to the employees to be discharged. (See, fur-
ther, Table 1 below.) Whether a company goes into liquidation or opts for
provisional supervision might seem to its employees to be largely a matter of
chance, and certainly not within their control. Thus, for example, within a
group of insolvent companies there might be one or two companies that go
into provisional supervision, whilst the other companies are wound up: some
employees" would be paid off at once and in full, whilst other employees
27 There is, these commentators would suggest, one particular drafting difficulty with the provision.
Para 3 (d) is concerned with (a) all debts and liabilities owing "by virtue of the Employment Ordi-
nance" to former employees and (b) all wages "owing by virtue of that Ordinance" to existing
employees. The difficulty is that, on the face of it, a claim for wages (by former or existing employees)
does not arise "by virtue of' the Employment Ordinance. The Ordinance does have various provi-
sions about how, when and where wages should be paid - wages must be paid in cash (or by cheque
etc), as soon as possible after falling due and may not be paid in a shop, a place of amusement or any
place where alcohol is served etc - but a claim for wages arises by virtue of the employment contract
between the parties, rather than by virtue of the Ordinance. It is submitted that some clarification is
required in the legislation.
2 See s 266B of the Companies Ordinance.
29 Note Re MC Bacon Ltd [19901 BCC 79.
30 See n 27 above.
31 Namely, those employees whose employer has gone into provisional supervision (rather than liquidation).
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would have to wait for their claims to be settled by the PWIF and then only
up to specified maximum amounts. Finally, although the reference to "all
debts and liabilities" in the Corporate Rescue Bill might seem at first sight to
benefit workers, these commentators suspect that in practice the opposite
might often be the case; as the "all debts and liabilities" provision would
make a rescue more difficult to initiate, the consequence may well be that a
company that might otherwise have had a chance of being saved will instead
end up in liquidation - and employment that might have been preserved will
have been lost.
The position of employees in respect of unpaid wages is set out in the
following table (similar, if not greater, disparities exist in relation to sever-
ance payments).
Table 1
Comparison of Treatment of Outstanding Workers' Wages
Under Various Insolvency Procedures'la
Type of case Compulsory Creditors' Receivership Provisional Alternative
Winding Up Voluntary Supervision Proposal
Liquidation (the Corporate (Suggested by
Rescue Bill) Smart &
Booth)
Amount HK$36,000 (max)* HK$8,000 (max) HK$8,000 (max) all debts HK$36,000 (max)
from PWIF under s 265, as under s 79, (no limit) as employee
preferential as preferential protected debt
creditor creditor in provisional
supervision
Time limit no wages outside no wages outside no wages outside no time limit no wages outside
4-month period 4-month period 4-month period 4-month period
In a compulsory winding up, an employee's claim as a preferential creditor for outstanding wages is
$8,000; that sum is often claimed by the PWIF, having already made (larger) payments to the em-
ployee from the Fund.
31a From this Table it is apparent why employees will seek to get legal aid and present a winding-up
petition, even if a company is already in voluntary liquidation. See Re Rena Gabriel HK Ltd [1995] 2
HKC 273.
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As has already been noted, the treatment of workers' wages under the
2000 Bill attracted considerable adverse comment from the legal and account-
ing professions. Moreover, in the Legislative Council, the Bills Committee
in June 2000, having identified the treatment of workers' wages as an issue
of major concern, pointed out that the 2000 Bill did not allow for any
flexibility;32 so that, even if a company's workers consented, it would not be
permitted for a company to pay the workers less than 100 per cent of their
entitlements whilst at the same time providing them with some other consid-
eration (such as stock options). The Bills Committee recommended the "early
resubmission" of the corporate rescue proposals to the (then) incoming Leg-
islative Council and, in the meantime, suggested that: "the Administration
should meet with various professional bodies ... so that the proposals can be
fine-tuned".3 In early 2001, it was indicated to legislators that re-submission
was imminent and, in particular, that the Administration - after consulta-
tion with the PWIF Board and the Labour Advisory Board - was not minded
fundamentally to amend its treatment of outstanding workers' wages and other
entitlements." The Corporate Rescue Bill has, as noted above, adhered to
the approach taken in the 2000 Bill.
An Alternative Proposal
These commentators would respectfully agree with the LRC that the most
rational approach to workers' wages would be to extend the PWIF to provi-
sional supervision. As far as unscrupulous employers are concerned, the Labour
Department already has the ability to prosecute employers who take advan-
tage of their employees' labour when they are aware that there is no reasonable
prospect of the employees being paid their wages as they become due." With
respect to the solvency (or potential insolvency) of the PWIF, it has been
Hong Kong's general economic situation - not the prospect of the introduc-
tion of provisional supervision - that has already made this a pressing issue.
Further, there are three main reasons why extending the PWIF to provisional
32 Report of the Bills Committee on the Companies (Amendment) Bill 2000 to House Committee Meeting on
9 June 2000 (Legislative Council Paper, CB(l) 1779/99-00), p 4, which is available at http://
legco.gov.hk/yr99-00/english/bc/bcO6/reports/bcO6_rpt.htm.)
31 Ibid., p 5.
34 See n 10 above. It would appear that whilst the Administration was contemplating some alteration to
the general position taken in the 2000 Bill, the PWIF Board and the Labour Advisory Board were
resistant to change (ibid.).
35 Section 31 of the Employment Ordinance (breach of which is by s 63A made a criminal offence)
provides: "(1) No person shall enter into, renew or continue a contract of employment as an em-
ployer unless he believes upon reasonable grounds that he will be able to pay all wages due under the
contract of employment as they become due. (2) An employer shall, if he ceases to believe upon
reasonable grounds that he will be able to pay all the wages due by him under a contract of employ-
ment as they become due, forthwith take all necessary steps to terminate the contract in accordance
with its terms."
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supervision would likely have little net effect on the solvency of the PWIF.
First, the number of companies that may in the future go into provisional
supervision will inevitably be only a fraction of those forced into insolvent
liquidation. (The costs associated with provisional supervision will clearly
put the procedure out of reach of the bulk of Hong Kong companies.)36 Sec-
ondly, the majority of companies that go into provisional supervision will be
doing so in an attempt to avoid insolvent liquidation; in relation to these com-
panies the PWIF would have to pay the workers in any event. The only
additional financial burden on the PWIF would be in respect of those (surely
very few) companies that would choose to go into provisional supervision
even though they were not facing the imminent prospect of insolvent liqui-
dation." Thirdly, even where payments to workers were made by the PWIF,
it would be able to recoup at least a percentage of those payments by way of
subrogation in the provisional supervision. On the other hand, the financial
benefit to the PWIF would be that provisional supervision should save em-
ployment that would otherwise have been lost; if, for example, fifty jobs with
a company can be saved through provisional supervision (jobs that would
have been lost in a liquidation), there will be fifty fewer workers seeking
severance payments from the PWIE 8
Nevertheless, in light of the refusal to extend the ambit of the PWIF, these
commentators would put forward an alternative suggestion. Our starting point
is that the treatment of outstanding workers' wages, assuming no involve-
ment on the part of the PWIF, should be based upon the following criteria:
1 the treatment of workers' wages and other entitlements should neither
prevent nor be a serious impediment to a company going into provi-
sional supervision;
2 employees should not be "left out in the cold"; more particularly,
employees should in substance be no worse off in a provisional
supervision than they would be were their employer to go into com-
pulsory liquidation;
3 any new approach must be equitable (to both the workers and the com-
pany's other creditors); and
36 Small companies and even small to medium sized companies are very unlikely to be able to afford the
professional fees that will inevitably be connected with provisional supervision; such companies
always account for the majority of liquidations.
3 In fact, the LRC was concerned that Hong Kong directors would be unwilling to put their companies
into provisional supervision, as to do so would mean handing over control (albeit only temporarily)
to an outsider; see, generally, Charles D. Booth, "Hong Kong Corporate Rescue Proposals: Making
Secured Creditors More Secure" (1998) 28 HKLJ 44.
3 Whilst there is some force in the argument that the PWIF should not be used to "subsidise" corporate
rescues, it should not be overlooked that the funding of the PWIF comes not from the Government's
general revenue, but directly from business itself (by means of a levy on the issue of business registra-
tion certificates).
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4 any proposal must not place an excessive administrative burden on the
provisional supervisor.
In the light of these criteria, our proposal is that the legislation should be re-
drafted so as to contain three elements:
1 a new concept, which we would call "employees' protected debts",
should be introduced; this would be defined in order to precisely track
the various amounts which may presently be claimed from the PWIF
upon a compulsory liquidation;
2 every proposal by a provisional supervisor for a voluntary arrangement
(to be put within the initial 30-day moratorium to the creditors' meet-
ing) must contain a provision to the effect that any outstanding
employees' protected debtS39 will be immediately satisfied in cash upon
the voluntary arrangement coming into effect; 40 and
3 the legislation should expressly state that the court may not extend the
moratorium beyond the initial 30-day period, unless the provisional
supervisor undertakes that, within 14 days of the court granting the
extension, all the employees' protected debts4' will be paid off.
A rough outline of the manner in which our suggestions might work in prac-
tice is as follows. First, provisional supervision could be initiated, and accordingly
the moratorium come into effect (thereby giving the company an all-important
breathing space), without any payments being made "up front" to the workers.
Secondly, if the provisional supervision collapses within the initial 30-day mora-
torium period," the company will go into liquidation and the workers will have
their normal rights and remedies (including, when the statutory requirements
have been made out, applying to the PWIF for ex gratia payments). Third, if a
plan for a voluntary arrangement is approved by the creditors within the 30-day
period, the terms of the arrangement must provide for the immediate payment in
full (in priority to everything else) of the employees' protected debts. Finally,
where the provisional supervisor believes a voluntary arrangement can be achieved
but he requires an extension of the moratorium, the court will only grant an
extension upon the condition that 3 the employees' protected debts are paid in
full within 14 days of the court's order. If the provisional supervisor cannot give
39 As at the date of the creditors' meeting.
40 The only exception would be where an employee has waived this right in writing, thereby meeting
the flexibility point raised in the Bills Committee. See text accompanying n 32 above.
41 As at the date of the court order.
42 It is highly likely that a significant proportion of all provisional supervisions would fail at such an
early stage.
43 Unless the workers have agreed otherwise in writing (see n 40 above) and the court is satisfied that
their interests have been adequately protected.
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an undertaking to make these payments, no extension will be granted and the
company will be put into liquidation.
Although in a case where provisional supervision continues beyond the
initial 30-day moratorium period, the workers might have to wait some six or
seven weeks from the date the provisional supervisor was appointed before
receiving their unpaid wages and other entitlements (up to the levels laid
down by the PWIF), such a delay is not significantly different from the delay
that would normally accompany a claim to the PWIF in a compulsory wind-
ing up.44 Moreover, the possible benefit to workers in such circumstances
would be two-fold: not only might some or all of their jobs be saved where a
voluntary arrangement enables the company's business to continue in whole
or in part, but also any wages or other entitlements still owing to an employee
(over and above the protected amounts) would be an unsecured debt under
the voluntary arrangement (and, in all probability, some dividend could be
anticipated in due course).
It might be useful to consider how these proposals would operate if a com-
pany like, let us say, United Dockyards Ltd were to go into provisional
supervision." The company would appoint a provisional supervisor who, after
ascertaining that a plan for voluntary arrangement was a realistic possibility,
would apply to the court for an extension to the initial 30-day moratorium. The
provisional supervisor would be aware that the court would require prompt
payment of protected debts owed to the employees as a condition for the grant-
ing of an extension of the moratorium; the provisional supervisor would,
accordingly, take appropriate steps to ascertain the amounts owed to the em-
ployees as protected debts and would be ready to make payment shortly
after the court order. The employees would not have to face the sort of
lengthy delays that currently occur, as in the United Dockyards case, where a
company promotes a scheme of arrangement. (A scheme of arrangement is, at
present, the only formal (statutory) mechanism available under which a pro-
posal for a corporate rescue or re-structuring can be pursued.)46 Under our
proposal, within only a few weeks of the appointment of the provisional super-
visor, the employees would receive substantial payments. In addition, the amount
of the employees' protected debts would be far more generous than the sums
presently recoverable by employees as (preferential) creditors in a scheme of
arrangement.47
44 The performance pledge of the Labour Department is to make payments from the PWIF within 10
weeks of the date of the filing of a winding-up petition: see The Annual Report of the Protection of
Wages on Insolvency Fund Board 1998-99 (n 19 above), p 5.
45 See Re UDL Holdings Ltd (No. 3), (n 12 above).
46 See Companies Ordinance, s 166.
4 A claim for (up to a maximum of) HK$8,000 in respect of wages is a preferential debt in a winding-
up and a scheme of arrangement would normally provide for payment of that preferential amount in
full.
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Conclusion
The pressing need for the introduction of a statutory corporate rescue mecha-
nism into Hong Kong insolvency law is undeniable. It is perhaps unfortunate
that the treatment under the 2000 Bill of outstanding workers' wages and
other entitlements attracted so much attention and thereby apparently con-
tributed to a delay in the implementation of the proposed provisional
supervision regime. Even though the Corporate Rescue Bill has retained the
all debts and liabilities approach, these commentators would maintain that a
statutory rescue regime that is in certain regards seriously flawed is better
than nothing at all. Yet, sooner or later, the "all debts and liabilities in ad-
vance" approach will likely have to be re-thought. As experience in other
jurisdictions has shown, insolvency laws, and in particular rescue mechanisms,
are not immutable and are constantly being refined.48 Whilst these commen-
tators would not suggest that their proposal is ideal (or anywhere near ideal),
its major advantage over the approach in the Corporate Rescue Bill is that it
would in no way inhibit a company in financial difficulty from obtaining the
all-important breathing space that the moratorium allows. At the same time,
it is hoped that the proposal strikes a fair balance between the interests of the
employees and of the company's other creditors, and promotes fairness as be-
tween different groups of employees.
48 Reference may here be made to the various proposals in the United Kingdom over the last decade for
reform of the CVA procedure. See the Insolvency Act 2000, s 2 and Schedule 1.
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